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CASE COMMENTS
MINES AND MINERALS-COAL MINING RIGHTS-WAVER OF SUB-
JACENT SUPPORT.-P'S sued to recover for injuries to the surface of
their land caused by D's failure, in mining and removing coal, to
provide adequate support for the surface. The deed of severance
granted all the coal together with the rights of mining and remov-
ing said coal. D contended that the mining rights conveyed by the
deed permitted the removal of all the coal free from any obligation
to provide support for the surface. A demurrer to the declaration
was sustained by the trial court which, on its own motion, certified
its ruling to the Supreme Court of Appeals. Held, reversed. The
severance deed did not divest the surface owners of their right of
subjacent support. Winnings v. Wilpen Coal Co., 59 S.E.2d 655
(W. Va. 1950). See also Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 62 S.E.2d
337 (W. Va. 1950), wherein the same construction was placed
upon severance deeds practically identical with the one construed
in the principal case.
In the case of Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53
S.E. 24 (1905), it was held that the owner of the surface of a tract
of land had relinquished his right of subjacent support because he
had sold all his coal together with the right to remove all of the
coal. The court said there was a vast difference between a grant of
the coal simply and a grant of the coal together with the right to
remove all of it. In the principal case the severance deed
granted all the coal together with the right to remove the
said coal. Compare this with the deed in the Griffin case.
The words used are the same in both deeds except that in
the principal case the word "said" is used in the mining clause
instead of the word "all". The deed in the Griffin case was
held to be unambiguous. Id. at 495, 516, 53 S.E. at 30, 38. In the
principal case the court said: "The rule of the Griffin case is based
upon the use of the word 'all' in connection with the mining rights
conveyed, and the failure to use, in the mining clause, the word
'all' or its necessary, unqualified, or exact counterpart or equivalent
renders the rule inapplicable in any particular instance. Here the
words 'said coal' can not be said to be the exact or complete
equivalent of 'all the coal', even though the words 'said coal' refer
generally to the conveyance of all the coal." At 661. It seems that
the words "said coal" can refer to nothing else but "all the coal",
there being no other antecedent to which it could apply. Would
not therefore the words apply specifically, rather than "generally",
as was said by the court, to their only antecedent "all the coal"?
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The court admits that the words "said coal" refer to the grant
of all the coal but says that these words "do not necessarily mean
all the coal; they may mean as much of the coal conveyed as can be
removed without injury to the surface." At 661. Following this
line of reasoning, could not the same argument apply where, as in
the Griffin case, the word "all" was used? Here the word "said"
could mean nothing else but its only antecedent "all". Cf. Hodge
v. Garten, 116 W. Va. 564, 182 S.E. 582 (1935), wherein the word
"all" was said to mean less than all.
If the words "said coal" do not refer to and intend "all the
coal", would not the mining clause of the deed have read only "the
coal", thus dispensing with the use of the word "said"? The deci-
sions are numerous in which the courts have construed and inter-
preted the word "said". See 38 W. & P. (Pern.) 25 et seq. In no
case found has it been held to have no meaning. The West Vir-
ginia court has held that "in the construction of a deed, effect must
be given to every part and every word therein contained if possible
to do so." Griffin v. Coal Co., supra at 494, 53 S.E. at 30. Italics
supplied. See also Stephenson v. Kuntz, 131 W. Va. 599, 49 S.E.2d
235 (1948) and the numerous cases there cited.
It would seem therefore that the severance deed was not ren-
dered ambiguous merely by using the word "said". Considering the,
deed as a whole and taking the words used therein in the manner
in which they are generally understood and received, they can have
only one meaning. Stephenson v. Kuntz, supra; Mills v. Edgell, 69
W. Va. 421, 71 S.E. 574 (1911); Williams v. South Penn Oil Co.,
52 W. Va. 181, 43 S.E. 214 (1902). Therefore, there is no room for
construction; the writing must speak for itself. Bruen x. Thaxton,
126 W. Va. 330, 28 S.E.2d 59 (1943); Griffin v. Coal Co., supra; Uhl
v. Ohio River R.R., 51 W. Va. 106, 41 S.E. 340 (1902).
If, however, there were a doubt as to whether the deed was
ambiguous, then the rule that the deed must be construed most
strongly against the grantor would be applicable. "'Where the
grant shows the intention, even though ambiguously stated, follow-
ing the rule that it is construed most strongly against the grantor,
the right to surface support will be held not to exist.' ". Griffin v.
Coal Co., supra at 516, 53 S.E. at 38. Italics supplied. See also
Swope v. Pageton Pocahontas Coal Co., 129 W. Va. 813, 41 S.E.2d
691 (1947); Weekley v. Weekley, 126 W. Va. 90, 27 S.E.2d 591
(1943). 11
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If the mining clause by the use of the words "said coal" does
not refer to and mean all the coal, why then was a mining clause
inserted in the deed? Indeed, the effect of the construction placed
on the mining clause in the principal case renders it useless and
redundant, mere surplusage. A grant merely of "the coal" in a
severance deed containing no mining clause whatsoever would
give the grantee, as an incident to the ownership of the coal, "the
right to use the surface in such manner and with such means as
would be fairly necessary to the enjoyment of the mineral estate",
Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va. 807, 121 S.E. 90 (1924), in other
words, all the rights and privileges to mine and remove the coal that
the grantees were said to have received in the principal case. Thus,
the court now holds that the same legal effect is to be given to, the
same expression of intention manifests itself from, each of the fol-
lowing grants: (1) A grants to B the coal under Blackacre, and (2)
A grants to B all the coal under Blackacre together with the right
to enter upon and under the land to mine and remove said coal.
But, if A grants to B all the coal under Blackacre together with the
right to enter upon and under the land to mine and remove all the
coal, there is evidenced an intention to waive the right of subjacent
support.
The principal case, therefore, even if it is not a departure from
the rule laid down in the Griffin case, indicates convincingly that
the court intends to limit this rule to the particular facts of that
case. Rightly or wrongly, the court, in this instance, leaves no
room for the application of accepted rules regarding the construc-
tion and meaning of written instruments. In its place, in this
instance, it will now apply a rigid and artificial rule of thumb, to
wit: Only the word "all" or its exact equivalent when used in
the mining clause of a severance deed evinces the intention neces-
sary to indicate a waiver of the right of subjacent support.
W. E. C.
SALES-BULK SALES AcT-LEssOR NOT CREDITOR AS TO FUTURE
RENT.-P leased premises to F, who operated a hardware store
thereon, for two years. The lease provided for a fixed gross rental
payable in monthly installments. Five months after the lease was
executed F sold his entire stock to D. F, having paid his current
monthly rent, and neither F nor D considering P as a creditor, they
failed to include P in the list of F's creditors given notice in the
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